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D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE A. JUDD, plaintiffs
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BRUCE McMULLIN; WESTERN ENVIRO-SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah corporation; WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, INC., General Partner; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; and W.E.S./MHP JOINT VENTURE, as a partnership or unincorporated joint
venture, defendants.
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JURISDICTION
I urisdiction to 1 lear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as
amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness without according them
deference. Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). This is true even if the
conclusions of law are denominated findings of fact. State By and Through Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Judds believe that this is a matter of first impression for this court and that, therefore, there are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceedings
The Judds conveyed by warranty deed a parcel of property in conjunction with a
Real Estate Exchange Agreement to Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. The property was
subsequently conveyed to W.E.S./MHP Joint Venture, who subsequently conveyed to
Waterside Associates who constructed an apartment complex on the property. (Appellees
are referred to herein collectively as "Waterside".) In 1985, the Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company filed an action against Waterside claiming a fee interest in the property.
Waterside joined Judds as third-party defendants to defend title to the property.
In 1987, Judds commenced an action against Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. and
other parties, including Waterside, for non-payment of amounts due under the Real Estate
Exchange Agreement and foreclosure on the property.
consolidated with the 1985 lawsuit.
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This action was subsequently

During the course of the lawsuit, Judds were represented by three different sets of
counsel. Upon entry of appearance by Judds' present counsel, Judds engaged in discovery
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ressed a preference for defending their title at trial. I "rior to trial, Waterside participated
in several settlement negotiations which did not include Judds

As trial neared, Waterside
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settlement with Cahoon & Maxfield, the trial court determined that the only issues to be
resolved were whether Judds were liable to Waterside f^r b m c h of warranty or breach of
1

-

natiun based t:\
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:oi ill ::! make the dete rmi)•* :r;ci. *\ ,n subsequently, without entering

specific findings of fact in suppoi 1: of its k gal conclusion, found that the J i ldds 1 lad
breached their duty to defend and awarded costs and attorney fees to Waterside.

Statement of F acts
1. On August 17, 1983, the Judds conveyed by warranty deed the subject parcel of
property to Western Enviro Systems, Inc

(Record, 001 22; Defendant's Exhibit 1)
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action against Waterside alleging, among other things, a fee simple interest in a 33 foot
wide strip of land aligned with its canal across the property. (Record, 00001)
4. On November 10, 1986, Appellees, as Third-Party Plaintiffs, filed a complaint
against Judds, as Third-Party Defendants, to require them to defend title to the property.
(Record, 00106; Record, 00870 (Trial Transcript), page 9, lines 23-24)
5. Judds were represented by two law firms prior to entry of appearance by Judds'
present counsel on August 18, 1988 (Record, 00426).
6. The Judds instructed their present counsel to examine the records of the ditch
company to evaluate the fee claim (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17). Appellant's counsel
immediately initiated discovery (E.g., Notice of Deposition at Record, 00437).
7. Judds' counsel researched the facts, making available to counsel, including counsel for Waterside, a letter from counsel for Cahoon & Maxfield disavowing fee simple
claim to the property (Record, 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Plaintiffs exhibit 4).
8. Judds' counsel also researched the law surrounding the fee simple claim, including evaluation of an attorney's opinion letter secured by the Judds in November of 1986
(Record 00870, page 17, lines 17-18).
9. Waterside negotiated on several occasions with Cahoon & Maxfield, the latest
beginning ten days before trial (Record, 00870, page 5, lines 15-19). The Judds were not
present at or invited to these negotiations.
10. The Saturday before trial, Waterside again negotiated with Cahoon & Maxfield,
entering into a settlement agreement (Record, 00870, page 7, lines 11 et seq.; page 8, lines
1-2). The Judds were not represented at the settlement negotiations.
11. The settlement was entered into even though Waterside acknowledged valid
4

defenses to the fee claim (Record, 00870, page 7, lines 2-3).
12. On the day of trial, the Judds appeared, ready to defend their title. They were
advised that Waterside had settled with Cahoon & Maxfield. The trial court determined
the only remaining issue to be that related to breach of duty to defend. The Judds and
Waterside stipulated that the trial court could take evidence by proffer for purposes of
resolving the remaining issue.
13. Waterside proffered testimony that Judds had failed and refused to accept the
defense of the title (Record, 00870, page 8, lines 17-19).
14. Judds proffered testimony showing they were actively involved in defense of the
title (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17; Record, 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Record 00870,
page 17, lines 17-18).
15. The trial court entered, among others, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
a. Finding of Fact No. 4: When sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand
upon the Judds to defend title. The Judds' defense consisted merely of appearing
at trial announcing that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple
ownership. The record shows that the Judds effectively refused to defend the title
throughout the lengthy period of time that this litigation pended. (Record, 00809,
emphasis in original.)
b. Finding of Fact No. 9: Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a
stipulated resolution of their claims, wherein Waterside would take certain actions
to insure action [sic] to the ditch for Cahoon, but would not lose fee simple title to
the area in question. The cost to third-party plaintiffs to settle Cahoon's claims was
$51,000 ($36,000 to widen the canal; $15,000 cash settlement). The Judds refused
offers to participate in the negotiations that lead [sic] to the settlement between
Waterside and Cahoon. (Record, 00910, emphasis in original.)
c. Conclusion of Law No. 5: The duty to defend and warrant the title in the
Warranty Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more than appear at
the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside had settled, and boldly announce
that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. (Record,
5

00811.)
d. Conclusion of Law No. 6: The Judds have breached their duty to defend
and warrant the title. Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to be indemnified for the
cost they incurred in defending title in the amount of $78,500 ($36,000 to widen
canal; $15,000 cash settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees), both the costs related to
effecting the settlement and to attorneys fees. (Record, 0811 to 00812.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's findings of fact related to Judds5 duty to defend title are not supported by the record. Because this is an equity case and the testimony was proffered
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, this court may weigh the evidence and need give no
deference to those findings. Based upon the record, the trial court's findings are clearly
erroneous and should be set aside.
The trial court erroneously interpreted the facts, concluding that Judds had done
nothing but show up at trial ready to defend the title. It also incorrectly concluded that
Judds had breached their warranty of title. Both of these conclusions are erroneous as a
matter of law.
Judds did everything reasonably required of them to defend the title which they
conveyed and warranted. If there was a breach due to earlier, incorrect legal advice, that
breach was cured by the subsequent active participation of Judds' present counsel in defense of the title. Further, as a matter of law, Judds have a right to defend the title they
warranted, even if the case goes to trial, and were deprived of that right. That deprivation
amounts to a waiver of Waterside's claims of breach of duty to defend. Under any evaluation of the law and the facts, the trial court's conclusion that Judds breached their duty to
defend is erroneous and should be set aside.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE JUDDS
HAD REFUSED TO DEFEND TITLE AND REFUSED TO
PARTICIPATE IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. LACKING THE
NECESSARY EVIDENTIARY BASIS THOSE FINDINGS
ARE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The only indications that the Judds may have failed to defend title are contained in
the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint (Record, 00106) and the testimony proffered
pursuant to stipulation of the parties (Record, 00870, page 8, lines 17-19). By contrast, the
evidence shows that Judds, through their present counsel, were actively involved in defense
of the title. Judds examined the records of the irrigation company to evaluate the fee
claim (Record, 00870, page 20, line 17), engaged in discovery (E.g., Notice of Deposition,
Record, 00437 and Record, 00586), researched facts and made evidence available to other
counsel (Record 00870, page 18, lines 9-11; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4), researched the law (E.g.,
Record 00870, page 17, lines 17-18), and appeared at trial ready to defend title.
There is no evidence in the record that Judds were ever offered a change to participate in settlement negotiations. Nor is there evidence that they refused to participate in
those negotiations.
Because the proffered testimony was made upon stipulation by the parties, this court
need not accord the factual findings of the trial court the normal deference and need only
sustain those findings if convinced of their correctness. Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger,
793 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah App. 1990). Since this is a case in equity, this court is permitted
to weigh the facts. Crimmins v. Simonds. 636 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 1981). Comparing the
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evidence of record, it is apparent that there is more evidence in support of the proposition
that Judds were defending title than in support of the claim that they breached their duty
to defend.
Even viewed in a light most favorable to the findings, those findings are clearly
erroneous. There is no evidentiary support for the portion of Finding No. 9 that the Judds
refused to participate in the settlement negotiations. The record clearly does not support
Finding No. 4 that Judds refused to defend the title throughout the litigation. Because the
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, they should be set aside by this court.
POINT II
JUDDS DID NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BREACH
THEIR WARRANTY OF TITLE OR DUTY TO DEFEND.
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE SET ASIDE.
A.

THE TRIAL COURTS ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS
GAVE RISE TO AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION OF LAW.
The trial court's statement in Conclusion No.5 is probably a correct statement of the

law:
The duty to defend and warrant the title in the Warranty
Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more than
appear at the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside had
settled, and boldly announce that they were ready to defeat
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. (Record, 00811.)
However, there is no evidence in the record which would provide a factual basis for this
conclusion as applied to the Judds. As discussed in Point I, Judds did much more than
appear at trial and "boldly announce that they were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee
simple ownership." They investigated the facts, researched the law, participated in discov8

ery, prepared their defense and appeared at trial ready to defend the fee claim.
Further, there is nothing in the record showing that Judds had knowledge of the
settlement. Even if they did know of the settlement, it would not have any bearing on the
fact that they had prepared and were ready to defend the title.
While the trial court's statement of the law would appear to be correct, the factual
basis for applying this conclusion to Judds does not exist. The application of this conclusion to Judds is, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT JUDDS HAD BREACHED
THEIR WARRANTY OF TITLE IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The trial court's Conclusion No. 6 holds that Judds breached their duty to warrant

title. "As a general rule, there is no breach of a covenant of warranty or for quiet enjoyment until there is an eviction under paramount title." 7 Thompson, Real Property § 3196,
p. 353 (emphasis added). This breach occurs only when it is conclusively shown that the
grantor did not own the property he conveyed by the warranty deed description. Creason
v. Peterson. 470 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1970).1
Because the original claim by Cahoon & Maxfield was settled, no determination was
ever made regarding the claim to fee title. There was no eviction under paramount title,
actual or constructive, nor was it conclusively shown that Judds did not own the property
conveyed by their warranty deed. They did not, therefore, breach their warranty of title
and the trial court's conclusion that they did is clearly erroneous.

Citing 6 Powell, Real Property, § 905 (1969).
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C.

JUDDS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR DAY IN COURT TO DEFEND THE
TITLE WHICH THEY WARRANTED. WATERSIDE'S SETTLEMENT WITHOUT JUDDS' CONSENT, AFTER THEY HAD PREPARED THEIR DEFENSE,
WAIVED JUDDS DUTY TO DEFEND THE TITLE.
The object of notifying a grantor of a claim to title is "to give the covenantor a fair

opportunity to defend the title he has warranted, to the end that he may defeat an unjust
claim of superior title. . ." 61 A.L.R. 10, 173. In addition to the duty to defend title, a
grantor has a right to defend that belongs to him and not to the grantee or subsequent
grantees. Mellor v. Chamberlain, 672 P.2d 610, 613 (Wash. 1983). Included in the covenants statutorily imposed upon one who executes a warranty deed is the warranty to defend
the title "against all lawful claims whatsoever." Utah Code § 57-1-12 (1953) (emphasis
added). Nowhere is there a duty imposed upon a grantor to settle a claim of fee title.
Judds are entitled to defend the title which they conveyed and, if they choose to do
so, defend it at trial. They had researched the facts and the law and were prepared to
defend title. They, and they alone, were at risk for an adverse ruling on the fee simple
claim.
Waterside, though nominally at risk for an adverse ruling, would, as a matter of law,
have been indemnified by Judds through their warranty of title. Waterside was not, in
actuality, at risk. Even so, Waterside engaged in negotiations for and entered into a settlement of the fee simple claim without the consent of Judds. The effect of this settlement is
that it deprived Judds of their right to defend the title which they warranted. Having so
deprived Judds of their right to defend, the settlement by Waterside acts as a waiver of
their claim against Judds for breach of the duty to defend. In other words, if Waterside
wished to claim a breach of the duty to defend, they should not have deprived Judds of

10

their right to defeat, at trial, Cahoon & Maxfield's claim to superior title.
D.

IF, AT SOME POINT, THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND, THAT BREACH WAS CURED BY THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
OF JUDDS' PRESENT COUNSEL IN DEFENSE OF THE TITLE.
The trial court's Findings of Fact fail to specify the acts or omissions of Judds which

may have amounted to breach of their duty to defend. It is possible, as evidenced by the
argument in Point I, that the court looked at the early actions in this case and failed to
recognize the active participation of Judds' present counsel in defense of the title. If, in
fact, the finding of breach was based upon actions or inactions under the guidance of
former counsel, the direct involvement of Judds' present counsel in defense of the title
should act as a cure for the earlier breach.
The facts indicating the active participation of Judds' present counsel should, as a
matter of law, lead to the conclusion that there was no breach of the duty to defend or, at
least, that any prior breach was cured.
E.

JUDDS TOOK ALL ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE TITLE WHICH
THEY CONVEYED, THEREBY DISCHARGING THEIR DUTY TO DEFEND.
The duty to defend is statutory and applies only to the interest actually conveyed by

the warranty deed. Utah Code § 57-1-2 (1953); Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866, 868
(Utah 1979); Burton v. United States, 507 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1973).
In this action, Judds had no duty to defend claims related to easements or other
non-fee issues. The covenant to defend against these items was expressly excluded by the
language of the warranty deed. The only issue Judds had a duty to defend against was
Cahoon & Maxfield's claim to a fee interest. The duty to defend does not extend to pro-
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tecting any other of Waterside's interest nor to indemnification for attorney fees expended
in protecting those interests.
Judds were able and ready to defend against the fee claim. They had made reasonable investigation into the facts and law related to the claim. They appeared with counsel
at the time designated for trial and stated their readiness to proceed.
Judds were convinced from the facts and the law that Cahoon & Maxfield's fee
claim was without merit. Waterside characterizes this position as a denial of Judd's duty to
defend. On the contrary, it is a manifestation of their belief in a carefully reached legal
conclusion and of their readiness to show at trial that the claim was without merit.
That Waterside was not comfortable with Judds' posture does not minimize the fact
that they were ready, willing and able to defend the title, all that they were required by
statute to do. Waterside was not entitled to undertake that defense so long as Judds were
defending title. Merely because Waterside retained and paid counsel to defend the title
and protect any other interests it had does not prove that Judds failed or refused to defend
the title.
Waterside reached a settlement with Cahoon & Maxfield, precluding a hearing of
the fee claim on its merits. This eliminated the claim without determining its validity. By
doing this, Waterside prevented Judds from consummating their defense of the title.
Having blocked the opportunity to defeat the fee claim, Waterside should not be permitted
to claim that Judds failed to defend the title.
Judds did all that was reasonably necessary to evaluate the facts and the law and
were prepared to defeat Cahoon & Maxfield's fee claims at trial. This clearly discharges
their duty to defend the title which they conveyed. The trial court's Conclusion No. 6 is
12

clearly erroneous and should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
Neither the facts nor the law support the trial court's holding that Judds breached
their duty to defend. Since the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are clearly erroneous, the judgment of the trial court should be set aside and judgment entered in favor of
Judds.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1991.

Reed Brown
Attorney for Appellants and ThirdParty Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 18th day of June, 1991, I caused four copies of this
Appellant's Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Mark O. Van Wagoner
Christopher J. Condie
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDUM
1. Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 9, 1991.
2. Judgment, dated January 9, 1991.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

REVISED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a
limited partnership;
MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation;
and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE,

Civil No. C 85-5168

Defendants and ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
v.
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE
A Judd, husband and wife,
Third-Party Defendants.
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

This case was heard in a non-jury trial before the
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, District Court Judge, on November
14, 1989. Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company was not present,
its claims having been settled prior to trial.

Waterside

0G8C6

Associates, Machan-Hampshire

Properties, Inc. and W.E.S./MHP

Venture (hereinafter collectively referred to as "third-party
plaintiffs") were present and represented by their counsel of
record, Mark 0. Van Wagoner, Esq. and Christopher J. Condie, Esq.
D. Stoddard Judd and Valene A. Judd were present and represented
by their counsel of record, C. Reed Brown, Esq.

Western Enviro-

Systems, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel of
record, James L. Warlauiaont, Esq.

The matter proceeded by way of proffer of testimony by
all parties through their attorneys, and exhibits were marked and
received into evidence. Prior to trial, counsel submitted legal
memoranda to the Court.

Following the proffer of testimony,

further legal argument dealing directly with the evidence was
received by the Court.

Additional post-trial memoranda were

submitted to the Court at its request.

After having received the pleadings on file herein,
having received the evidence and exhibits of the parties, having
considered the arguments of counsel, being fully advised in the
premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

2
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. ("Western Enviro")

purchased a piece of property (the "Property") from D. Stoddard
Judd and Valene A. Judd (the "Judds") by Warranty Deed on August
17, 1983. The Warranty Deed given to Western Enviro by the Judds
contained the customary requirement to "defend and warrant" title
to the buyer.

The Warranty Deed contained the exceptions as

stated below;

SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions and
Rights of Way, currently of record and/or
enforceable in law and equity, and general
property taxes for the year 1983 and
thereafter, in any and all water rights of
record.
2.

By way of Quit Claim Deeds, Western Enviro and R.

Bruce McMullin

conveyed

their

interest

in the Property to

W.E.S./MHP Joint Venture.

On June 28, 1985, W.E.S./MHP Joint

Venture

property

transferred

the

to

Waterside

Associates

("Waterside") by Warranty Deed.

3.
Company

On September 27, 1985, Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation

("Cahoon") filed suit against third-party plaintiffs

claiming, among other things, a fee simple interest to a ditch
area that cut through Waterside's development.
3
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4.

When sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand upon the

Judds to defend the title.

The Judds' defense consisted merely

of appearing at trial announcing that they were ready to defeat
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership.

The record shows that

the Judds effectively refused to defend the title throughout the
lengthy period of time that this litigation pended.

5.

In September of 1986 the Judds began a non judicial

foreclosure proceeding against third party plaintiffs. Following
a hearing on August 6, 1987, the Court entered a preliminary
injunction against the Judds enjoining them from proceeding with
their foreclosure action.

6.

Third-party defendants have deposited $125,000 as

bond for the preliminary injunction, which are currently being
held in West One Bank account number 0100230194.

7.

On September 30, 1987, the Judds filed a Complaint

against the third party plaintiffs, McMullin and W.E.S., civil
no. C87-6497.

8.

That case was consolidated with C85-5168.

After consideration of Cahoon's claims and the

potential effects of an adverse ruling on the entire project,
Waterside

determined

that

the

risk

of

an

adverse

finding

4
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warranted some attempt at settlement and compromise with Cahoon.
i

I
9.

\

Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a

stipulated resolution of their claims, wherein Waterside would J
take certain actions to insure action to the ditch for Cahoon, ,
but would not lose fee simple title to the area in question. The i
cost to third-party plaintiffs to settle Cahoonfs claims was I
$51,000 ($36,000 to widen the canal; $15,000 cash settlement). |
i

The Judds refused offers to participate in the negotiations that
lead to the settlement between Waterside and Cahoon.

i

|
i

10. Third-party plaintiffs incurred [wore required to |
pay] $27,500 in attorneys fees to defend title to the property. I
No evidence was presented at trial adverse to the scope, cost or
reasonableness of the attorneys fees incurred by third-party

'
i

plaintiffs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

|

The Judds1 duty to defend title to the property

which they conveyed bv Warranty Deed arises from a covenant that
runs with the land.

Waterside has standing to assert its claim

against the Judds under the Warranty Deed given to Waterside's
predecessor in 1983.
5
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2.
not

Cahoon's claims of fee simple against the title are !

excluded

easements,

under the Warranty

restrictions

and

Deed.

rights

of

Excluded
way,

no

only
of

are I

which

constitutes a claim of fee simple ownership.

3.

J

The amount of land claimed by Cahoon would have

adversely impacted the complex built by Waterside.

Third-party

plaintiffs were justified in settling Cahoon's claims against

]

them.

4.

The scope and cost of Waterside's work to effect a

settlement which precludes a potential adverse verdict was both |
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

5.

The duty to defend and warrant the title in the !

Warranty Deed that the Judds gave requires that the Judds do more ,
I
than appear at the time of trial, with knowledge that Waterside j
had settled, and boldly announce that they were ready to defeat
Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership.
6.

The Judds have breached their duty to defend and

warrant the title.

Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to be

indemnified for the cost they incurred in defending title in the
amount

of

$78,500

($36,000

to
6

widen

canal;

$15,000

cash
I

ocsil

settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees), both the costs relating
to effecting the settlement and to attorneys fees.

7.

All claims asserted in C87-6497 are dismissed with

prejudice.

8.

Third-party plaintiffs are entitled to the release

of the bond for the preliminary injunction from West One Bank
account number 0100230194 to their counsel of record.

DATED this

R. HANSON
/Third Judicial District Court Judge

ATTEST
DepuiyCterk

QQS1Z

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
to be mailed this ^)S(

day of December, 1990, by depositing the

same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to:

E. J. Skeen, Esq.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P. 0. BOX 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
C. Reed Brown, P.C.
3450 South Highland Drive
Suite 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
James L. Warlaumont, Esq.
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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By
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Attorneys for Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

»-u- c ii-%a\

v.
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a
limited partnership;
MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation;
and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE,

civil No^r^c^iSj^ie^)
V c 87 : r 6497

Defendants and ThirdParty Plaintiffs,

D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE
A Judd, husband and wife,
Third-Party Defendants.
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

The Court, having reviewed the proffered evidence,
all

legal

memoranda

and

trial

exhibits

and

entered

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the
following Judgment:

00315

1.

That plaintiff

Cahoon

& Maxfield

Irrigation

Company's claims against defendants, Waterside Associates,
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., and W.E.S/MHP Venture be
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the stipulation between
the parties thereto;

2.

That

third-party

plaintiffs

Waterside

Associates, Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., and W.E.S./MHP
Venture are awarded judgment against third-party defendants,
D. Stoddard Judd and Valene A. Judd the sum of seventy eight
thousand five hundred dollars ($78,500) ($36,000 to widen the
canal; $15,000 cash settlement; $27,500 in attorneys fees),
with

interest

thereon

at the

rate

of

12% per annum as

provided by law and their costs of action.

3.
Valene

A.

That

Judd

all

claims

raised

in case no. C87-6497

by

D.

Stoddard

are dismissed

and
with

prejudice.

4.
account

That the money currently held in West One Bank

number

0100230194,

plaintiffs and their counsel.

be

released

to

third-party

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be mailed this

*2*^~ day

of June, 1990, by depositing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, to:

E. J. Skeen, Esq.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
C. Reed Brown, P.C.
3450 South Highland Drive
Suite 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
James L. Warlaumont, Esq.
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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